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【学术讲座】Cooperation in Social Dilemma Experiments

发布时间:2017年03月22日 来源: 点击数:

    为增强校内的学术氛围,增进研究人员的学术交流,提升研究人员的科研水平及论文写作水平,提高论文的发表率,光学影响分析与学习中心邀请国际知名复杂网络和大数据专家、北海道大学Marko Jusup博士举办专题讲座。欢迎广大科研工作者及研究生踊跃参加:

报 告 人:Marko Jusup博士,日本北海道大学助理教授

报告题目:Cooperation in Social Dilemma Experiments

时 间:2016年3月25日 上午9:50

地 点: 毅字楼6楼西侧光学影像中心会议室606室

内 容:

    One of the most elusive scientific challenges for over 150 years has been to explain why cooperation survives despite being a seemingly inferior strategy from an evolutionary point of view. Over the years, various theoretical scenarios aimed at solving the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation have been proposed, eventually identifying several cooperation-promoting mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. We report the results of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments with anonymous and onymous pairwise interactions among individuals. We find that onymity significantly increases the frequency of cooperation and the median payoff per round relative to anonymity. Furthermore, we also show that the correlation between players’ ranks and the usage of strategies (cooperation, defection, or punishment) underwent a fundamental shift, whereby more prosocial actions are rewarded with a better ranking under onymity. Our findings prove that reducing anonymity is a valid promoter of cooperation, leading to higher payoffs for cooperators and thus suppressing an incentive—anonymity—that would ultimately favor defection.